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DREW JESSES, ) 
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STEVE BAUGHMAN, ) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff commenced a lawsuit against the defendant 
claiming damages arising out of a business relationship between 
the parties. Defendant answered the Complaint and submitted 
Interrogatories to the plaintiff. Plaintiff failed to answer 
said Interrogatories or comply with a Court Order by the Honorable 
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., that the Complaint would be dismissed upon 
failure to answer said Interrogatories within fifteen (15) days. 
Approximately three (3) months later the Honorable Marcellus K. 
Snow entered an Ex Parte Order that the Complaint be dismissed 
with prejudice for failure to comply with the prior Court Order to 
file Answers to Interrogatories. Defendant thereafter filed a 
Motion to Vacate the Order entered by Judge Snow, which was 
granted and the case placed on the District Court trial calendar. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower Court granted plaintiff's Motion to Vacate 
Order along with placing the case on the regular District Court 
trial calendar and awarding the defendant $100.00 in attorney's 
fees. From this Order defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks an Order of this Honorable Court 
reversing the Order of Judge Snow and directing that the Dismissal 
with Prejudice be reinstated, that the case be removed from the 
trial calendar and declared to be finally resolved on the merits 
by reason of this and the original Order of Dismissal for failure 
to answer the Interrogatories submitted by defendant. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 1, 1974, defendant submitted Interrogatories 
to the plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. (R. 44,45) Plaintiff did not answer the Interrogatories 
as requested, and on January 23, 1975, defendant filed a Motion 
to Dismiss the Complaint for failure to provide discovery by 
answering the Interrogatories submitted July 1, 1974. (R. 43) 
Said Motion by defendant was heard on February 3, 1975, by the 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., at which time he entered his 
Order that the Motion to Dismiss was granted unless plaintiff 
answered the Interrogatories within fifteen (15) days. (R. 40) 
Thereafter, a copy of said Order was sent to plaintiff's 
attorney. (R. 40) 
On May 5, 1975, defendants Motion of Dismissal with 
Prejudice came on for hearing before the Honorable Marcellus K. 
Snow, and the Court thereupon entered its Order dismissing the 
above entitled action with prejudice. (R. 35) On May 13, 1975, 
plaintiff filed a Motion to Vacate the Order of said Judge Snow, 
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but misnumbered the file, to wit; 21660, instead of 216660 (R. 34) 
Plaintiff, thereafter filed a notice of hearing on said Motion 
on September 9, 197 5, almost four (4) months thereafter. Defendant 
was not aware that a Motion had been filed since it was not 
placed in tne proper file at the time of filing. At the hearing 
on said Motion, it was continued without date, to be reset on 
the Law and Motion Calendar. Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Order 
was then renoticed for hearing on November 5, 197 5, whereupon it 
was continued until December 11, 1975, to allow the parties to 
file Affidavits. On December 11, 1975, almost a year and a half 
later, plaintiff filed Answers to defendant's Interrogatories. 
(R. 18-20) At the hearing on plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Order 
on December 11, 197 5, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, ruled 
that this Motion just be heard by the Judge who had entered the 
Order subject to the Motion. The Motion was then referred to 
Judge Snow, who on February 17, 1976, again continued said Motion 
without date. On March 12, 1976, the Motion was heard by said 
Judge Marcellus K. Snow, who granted the Motion to Vacate his 
previous Order dismissing plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice 
and ordered that the case be set for trial. Defendant appeals from 
that Order and particularly that part ordering that the case be 
placed on the trial calendar. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE COURT TO 
GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO VACATE ITS PRIOR 
ORDER DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WITH 
PREJUDICE, AND PLACE THE CASE ON THE TRIAL 
CALENDAR IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH A PRIOR COURT 
ORDER, WHERE PLAINTIFF HAD FAILED TO COMPLY 
WITH THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE 
PREVIOUS ORDERS OF THE COURT. 
Rule 37(b) (2) (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that where a party fails to serve answers or objections 
to Interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, "the Court in which 
the action is pending on Motion may make such Orders in regard 
to the failure as are just, and among others it may take any action 
authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B) and (C) of Subsection (b) (2) 
of this rule." 
Paragraph (C) of Subsection (b)(2) states that, "an 
Order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further 
proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or 
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a Judgment by Default 
against the disobedient party." (emphasis added) When plaintiff 
had failed by over seven (7) months, to answer the Interrogatories 
propounded by defendant, said defendant sought appropriate relief 
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from the Court, pursuant to Rule 37(b) (2) (d) , incorporating 
Paragraph (C) of Subsection (b)(2) in the manner designated 
above. 
The Motion to Dismiss as filed by the defendant was 
granted on February 3, 1975, and the Order entered on February 7, 
1975, by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., after proper Notice 
and a hearing thereon. At that time, the plaintiff was ordered 
to answer the Interrogatories propounded by defendant within 
fifteen (15) days or the Motion to Dismiss would be granted. 
Plaintiff has never appealed this Order or moved to set it aside, 
or provided any reason why the Interrogatories were not answered 
as Ordered by the Court. The plaintiffs Complaint was dismissed, 
therefore, fifteen (15) days after the Order was signed by 
Judge Stewart Hanson, Jr., because of this failure by plaintiff 
to answer the Interrogatories. 
The subsequent Order signed by Judge Marcellus K. Snow 
was of no legal effect other than to reiterate, possibly in a 
more understandable manner, Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Jr.fs, 
previous Order. However, the subsequent Order of Judge Snow 
in placing the case on the regular trial calendar is in error, 
since the previous Order of Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., is a 
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final Order and has never been appealed from or vacated in any 
manner. This ruling, which places the case on the trial calendar, 
is ineffective since it attempts to overrule the Order of another 
District Court Judge, and one District Court Judge cannot alter or 
vary an Order of another District Court Judge pursuant to a Motion 
by one of the parties. In Peterson v. Peterson, 530 P2d 821, 
823 (1974), the Court held that, " (a) lthough it is not impossible 
under some circumstances, for one District Judge to vacate the 
Orders of his collegues, - ordinarily this cannot be done. To 
accomplish this feat would require such a procedure as appeal, or 
an unusual, independent procedure of some kind, - but not in 
virtue of the ordinary motions, orders to show cause and the 
like . . . " 
The defendant does not deny that the Court may vacate 
its own ruling dismissing plaintiff's Complaint. However, it is 
error for the Court to vacate its Order and at the same time 
place the matter on the trial calendar. This is outside the scope 
of its original ruling and in effect overrules the previous Order 
of Judge Stewart Mw Hanson, Jr., dismissing plaintiff's Complaint 
for failure to provide discovery. Peterson v. Peterson, supra. 
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Even if this Court should uphold the Order Granting the Motion to 
Vacate, it must deny the lower court's right to place the case 
on the trial calendar, since the case is still dismissed for_failure 
to make discovery, and the Order signed by Judge Marcellus K. Snow 
had no effect other than to dismiss a case which was already 
dismissed. Judge Snow did state, however, in the Order, itself, 
that the case was Dismissed with Prejudice, while the original; 
Order of Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., was silent as to whether 
it was dismissed with or without prejudice. 
Even, in this respect- the^ QxcLer conformed to that of 
Judge Hanson, Jr., since an involuntary dismissal is a final 
adjudication unless otherwise specified * Rule 41(b) provides in 
part that, "unless the Court in its Order for dismissal otherwise 
specifier, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal 
not provided for in this Rule, other than a dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable 
party, operates as an adjudication on the merits." In the case 
of Steiner v. State, 27 U2d 284, 495 P2d 809 (1972), the plaintiff 
filed an action against the State of Utah and Nephi City claiming 
negligence, to which both defendants filed Motions to Dismiss. 
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On December 12, 1968, both Motions were granted and Orders entered 
accordingly. Although the Order entered by the City of Nephi 
stated that the action was dismissed with prejudice, the Order 
regarding the State of Utah read as follows: 
"It is hereby Ordered that the Motion of 
defendant, State of Utah, to dismiss plaintiff's 
Complaint, is granted, and the same is hereby 
dismissed." 
No Motion to alter or amend and no appeal was taken from this 
Order. One year later, on December 12, 1969, the plaintiffs 
filed a Second Amended Complaint to which. bot±L_defendants- again 
made Motions- to Dismiss-*. Bottt Orders—were gran±ed,_ and the 
plaintiffs appealed after filing a Motion for Rehearing, which 
was denied. The Court held on appeal that, "The order entered 
on December 12, 1968, dealing with the motion of Nephi City to 
dismiss the complaint recited that the order dismissing the 
complaint was with prejudice and on the merits and it was the 
final adjudication of the issues as between the plaintiffs and 
the City and the time for appeal commenced to run upon entry 
of the Order. The order of dismissal made pursuant to the 
State's motion to dismiss was without prejudice insofar as the 
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State of Utah was concerned. However, even though the dismissal 
was without prejudice the order was a final adjudication and did 
noc authorize the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint in 
these proceedings." 
In the present case on appeal, the original Order of 
Dismissal entered by Judge Hanson, Jr., acted as a final adjudi-
cation on the merits which did not authorize the plaintiff to 
file an Amended Complaint, therefore, effectively rising to the 
status of a Dismissal with Prejudice-
POiNT HE. 
JUDGE SNOW SHOULD NOT HAVE VACATED HIS ORDER 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WHERE THE 
ORDER, IF AT ALL, CONSTITUTED HARMLESS ERROR 
IN DUPLICATING JUDGE STEWART Mo HANSON, JR.'S, 
ORDER. FURTHER, IT CONSTITUTES PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR TO THE DEFENDANT TO PLACE THE ACTION 
ON THE TRIAL CALENDAR WHEN THE PRIOR COURT 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL REMAINS IN EFFECT. 
Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that, "No error in either the admission or the exclusion of 
evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in 
anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties 
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is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a 
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to 
the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at 
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect 
in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights 
of the parties." Since plaintiff's Complaint was already dis-
missed on uhe merits at the time Judge Snow entered his Order 
of Dismissal with Prejudice, with the plaintiff having made no 
Motion to alter or amend that Order and his appeal time having 
expired,. such Order didi aot~a£fect the- plaintiff*^ aubsrtaj&tiaL 
rights, but: was at the most, only harmless error. As a result, 
the lower court committed reversible error by vacating the 
dismissal of plaintifffs Complaint where the plaintiff could 
only show that harmless error had been committed. 
Although nothing appears to prevent a District Judge 
from entering an Order in conformance with another District 
Judge's prior ruling, he cannot reverse or alter the ruling 
made by such other District Court Judge. Peterson v. Peterson, 
supra. By placing this case, which was previously dismissed 
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by another Judge onto the trial calendar, the lower court has 
abused its authority and committed an error that is detrimental 
to the substantial rights of the defendant, who is once again 
faced wirh defending a suit that has been dismissed. This is 
a clear abuse of discretion of the type warranting a reversal 
of the lower court. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 U 416, 
260 P2d 741 (1953). 
Although the reviewing Court will not reverse because 
of mere error, it will reverse a lower court ruling where the 
errors-is substantial and-- pre ju&xeial irr the senise that there is 
a reasonable liklihood that unfairness or injustice has resulted. 
Ewell and Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 27 U2d 188, 
493 P2d 1283 (1972). 
Further, statemsnts set forth in the Motion to 
Vacate Order and Affidavit of plaintiff do not show any mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect on the part of the 
defendant, any newly discovered evidence, any fraud or misrepre-
sentation or any reason for which the Judgment or Order is void, 
satisfied or released or any other reason for which this Court 
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has allowed relief from a Judgment or Order pursuant to Rule 60(b) 
of rhe Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that the 
trial court abused its discretion in vacating its own Order of 
Dismissal, and further committed prejudicial error in placing this 
case on the trial calendar, in that, doing so requires one District 
Court Judge to overrule another; and that this-Count shouJIcE deter-
mine that-the present case is aot subject tcr further*: litigations-
having been dismissed on its merits by the previous, unamended 
or vacated, Order of the prior sitting District Court Judge. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
RYBERG & McCOY 
Robert Ryberg 
Attorney for defendant-appellant 
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